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Abstract 
A European Court of Human Rights decision rendered in January 2015 (Elberte v. Latvia) has 
raised a curious question regarding the nature and scope of the right for relatives to consent to 
or to oppose the removal of a deceased person’s tissues. The decision suggests that Council of 
Europe member states must clearly define the scope of the right for relatives to express their 
preferences for removal of a deceased’s tissue or organs – provided such a right has been 
created in law – and member states must define the corresponding obligation or margin of 
discretion conferred on experts or other authorities to explain these rights to the relatives. 
Notwithstanding, this article asks whether the decision could open the door to a free-standing 
right for relatives to oppose removal of their deceased relative’s tissues or organs, regardless 
of the deceased person’s own wishes, in the name of the relatives’ human ‘right to respect for 
private life’.  
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Introduction 
Few subjects in life seem to raise as much consternation and circumspection as death. 
Not only do many of us fret over how and when we will die, and what will become of our 
patrimony and loved ones, we also have concerns – and try to attend to those concerns – over 
what will come of our bodies. Many wish to exercise choice during life over bodily remains 
in death. Such choice draws in familial and social considerations. When it comes to possible 
removal and donation of tissues, organs or whole bodies, choice is exercised often through 
communication with loved ones and some contemplation of prevailing social norms. Some 
choose to ‘dedicate’ their bodies or parts thereof to others, perhaps altruistically in the hope 
of furthering medical research or the lives of strangers or connected others, whereas others 
choose to be disposed of ‘whole’ – body and spirit as one – without any removal of the flesh.  
Allowing freedom of choice over what happens to one’s own inchoate cadaver has 
become a much-debated topic.1 A driving question for policymakers has been whether 
donation of tissues, organs or bodies should be the default position of the citizenry, with the 
available choice reduced to ‘opt out’ (i.e. refuse otherwise presumed donation), or whether 
each citizen, with or without communication with loved ones, must ‘opt in’ to express 
affirmatively their willingness to donate. Coupled with this question is the role of both health 
professionals and relatives in determining the scope of consent to removal and donation. Who 
must communicate to whom, about what, and how? Unsurprisingly, local values and 
knowledge have led to varying legislative responses across the world. Some jurisdictions 
foreclose, at least in law, the relevance of the deceased’s relatives’ opinions on donation 
altogether, whilst others explicitly or implicitly incorporate and value them. One question has 
remained unanswered, however, in a court of law: What happens when a jurisdiction’s 
legislation acknowledges the relevance of relatives’ views on removal and donation, but does 
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not spell out the nature and scope of the rights, nor the corresponding duties of the parties in 
ascertaining and operationalising those views? 
The member states of the Council of Europe have now been provided an answer, 
albeit a perplexing one. In a judgement rendered on 13 January 2015 (Elberte v. Latvia),2 
which followed a similar judgement rendered 6 months earlier,3 the European Court of 
Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) ruled that member states must define the scope of the right for 
relatives to express their preferences for removal of a deceased’s tissue or organs – provided 
such a right has been created in law – and member states must define the corresponding 
obligation or margin of discretion conferred on experts or other authorities to explain these 
rights to the relatives. But in answering one question, the ECtHR’s reasoning has critically 
raised another: Whether there could be a free-standing right for relatives to oppose removal 
of their deceased relative’s tissues or organs, regardless of the deceased person’s own wishes, 
in the name of the relatives’ human ‘right to respect for private life’. As such, the decision, 
which on a surface level is about the right of an individual to be free from arbitrary state 
intervention, upon further analysis raises deeper, anthropological, ethical and legal questions 
about the nature of autonomy in consenting to tissue and organ donation, for it indicates less 
a judicial acceptance of ‘relational autonomy,4 and more a potentially worrying precedent of 
an ‘autonomy of relations’ between relatives. In this article, we engage in multidisciplinary 
analysis to query whether such a free-standing right could be invoked, and to explore the 
question: Just whose tissue is it, anyway? The implications may be profound for tissue and 
organ donation, specifically, and medical law and human rights, generally. 
The Case 
Factual background 
On 19 May 2001, Mr Egils Elberts, a Latvian national, died in an automobile 
accident. The following day, his body was transported to the Forensic Centre in Riga, where 
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an autopsy was carried out. The Latvian Government alleged that after the autopsy, the 
forensic medical expert verified, as required by the law at that time, that there was no stamp 
in Mr Elberts’ passport denoting his objecting to the removal of his body tissue. Nor were 
any objections to the removal by Mr Elberts’ relatives communicated to the examiner. 
Consequently, a small portion of his body tissue was removed, purportedly, the Latvian 
Government claimed, for transplantation purposes. On 25 May, a relative retrieved the body 
and the next day, the funeral took place in Mr Elberts’ home town. This was the first time Mr 
Elberts’ wife, Ms Dztinra Elberte, saw her husband. She noticed that his legs had been tied 
together; he was buried this way. 
Two years later, in March 2003, Ms Elberte became aware that tissue had been 
removed from her husband’s body when the Latvian Security Police informed her that a 
criminal inquiry had been opened into the potentially illegal removal of organs and tissue 
from 1994 to 2003 for supply to a pharmaceutical company based in Germany. (Ultimately it 
was established that between 1999 and 2002, tissue had been removed from 495 people; in 
exchange for the supply of tissue, the German pharmaceutical company provided the 
Forensic Centre the financial means to purchase medical equipment and computers for 
medical institutions in Latvia.) Ms Elberte was recognized as an injured party in October 
2003. However, between 2005 and 2008, the prosecutors and superior prosecuting authorities 
vacillated as to whether a criminal case could be brought against the forensic medical 
examiners.  
In 2008, a group of forensic experts lodged an appeal contesting the reasons for their 
status as the persons against whom the criminal inquiry was instigated. On 26 June 2008, the 
Riga City Vidzeme District Court upheld their appeal. The court found that the relevant 
domestic law (Law on the Protection of the Body of Deceased Human Beings and the Use of 
Human Tissues and Organs in Medicine) (‘the Law’) as it existed from 1994 to March 2003 
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and tissues of a deceased person may not be removed against his or her wishes as expressed 
during his or her lifetime’, [but] ‘in the absence of express wishes, removal may be carried 
out if none of the closest relatives (children, parents, siblings or spouse) objects.’5 On 27 June 
2008, a final decision to discontinue the criminal inquiry was adopted due to Latvia’s 5-year 
statutory limitation period for a criminal inquiry. 
The ruling of the European Court of Human Rights  
Ms Elberte lodged a complaint with the ECtHR on 5 December 2008 against the 
Republic of Latvia for violating three Articles in the European Convention on Human Rights 
(‘the Convention’). Two are worth discussing in this article, one briefly and the other 
substantively.6  
First, Ms Elberte alleged a violation of Article 3,7 as her husband had been buried 
with his legs tied together and his tissue had been unlawfully removed, which she alleged was 
inhuman or degrading treatment and left her with significant emotional suffering. This claim 
was ultimately successful, as the ECtHR found that Ms Elberte faced undue delay (she had 
lodged 13 complaints and 4 decisions had been quashed), uncertainty and distress concerning 
the nature, manner and purpose of her husband’s tissue removal and that the anguish caused 
by seeing her husband’s legs tied together when his body had been returned to her caused 
suffering that went beyond the suffering inflicted by grief following the death of a close 
family member. That the claim was successful is unsurprising. Although the ECtHR admitted 
that it had never previously questioned in its case law the profound psychological impact of a 
serious human rights violation on the victim’s family member,8 it ruled that the facts of the 
case fell within the scope of the existing Convention jurisprudence that favours relatives who 
claim significant emotional suffering over how deceased loved ones are treated, especially 
where a key factual element is closeness of the familial bond and the way the authorities 
responded to the relative’s enquiries.9  
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Second, and of more interest for present purposes, however, is the nature of Ms 
Elberte’s other claim, namely, that her Article 8 right to respect for private life had been 
violated because her husband’s tissue had been removed without his or her prior consent 
(which, based on our reading of section 4 of the Law, we take to mean more accurately a 
‘right to object’), and that in the absence of such ‘consent’ (as the claim had been framed), 
her dignity, identity and integrity had been breached. Ms Elberte claimed that the removal of 
her husband’s tissue was an interference with her private life under Article 8(1) and that the 
interference had not been in accordance with the law and had not pursued a legitimate aim 
under Article 8(2), including to ‘save and/or improve the lives of others’, which the Latvian 
Government saw as falling under the heading of ‘protection of health’ and the ‘protection of 
the rights of others’ in Article 8(2). According to Ms Elberte’s claim, the forensic experts 
should have sought her consent before removing Mr Elberts’ tissue. Article 8 of the 
Convention reads as follows: 
 Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
The ECtHR noted that whilst the Latvian Government denied that Ms Elberte’s claim 
concerned the ‘family life’ component of Article 8,10 the Government did not contest that it 
fell within the ambit of ‘private life’. This itself is an interesting concession, as we discuss 
further below. Reiterating that the ECtHR has found the concept of private life to be a ‘broad 
term not susceptible to exhaustive definition’11 by citing its recent jurisprudence,12 the 
ECtHR made a point of highlighting, rather succinctly, that neither party disputed that Ms 
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Elberte’s right, established under the Law, to object to the removal of her husband’s tissue 
came within the scope of Article 8 insofar as private life is concerned. Indeed, the ECtHR 
saw ‘no reason to hold otherwise’.13 The rationale for excluding Ms Elberte’s claim under the 
Article 8 right to family life was not pursued any further in the decision. 
Article 8 protects an individual against arbitrary interference by public authorities, 
and according to para 2, any interference with one’s right to respect for private life must be 
‘in accordance with the law’. Referencing S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom,14 the 
ECtHR emphasized that this phrase means that an impugned measure must have some basis 
in domestic law (i.e. a legal basis component), ‘which should be compatible with the rule of 
law’ (i.e. a rule of law component), that is, the domestic law ‘must be formulated with 
sufficient precision and must afford adequate legal protection against arbitrariness . . . [and] 
must indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of discretion conferred on the competent 
authorities and the manner of its exercise’.15 Thus, the question before the ECtHR was 
whether Ms Elberte was unlawfully prevented from exercising her right to object to the 
removal of her husband’s tissue after his death due to the Latvian authorities’ alleged failure 
to ensure the legal and practical conditions for the exercise of that right.  
Upon analysis, the ECtHR noted that Ms Elberte was never informed that her 
husband’s tissue would be removed unless she expressed any contrary wish; this was 
apparently a common practice at the time. The ECtHR also noted that it was disputed whether 
the forensic expert had in fact verified that there was no stamp in Mr Elberts’ passport 
denoting his objecting to the use of his body tissue. Ms Elberte claimed the passport had been 
at their home at the time. Moreover, the ECtHR noted that the authorities responsible for 
enforcing the Law – the Security Police and supervising prosecutors – disagreed as to the 
Law’s scope of obligations in 2001, and this indicated a lack of sufficient clarity. Pulling 
these findings together, the ECtHR found that ‘it remains unclear how the system of consent, 
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as established in Latvian law at the material time, operated in practice in the circumstances in 
which the applicant found herself’.16 In the circumstances that arose, positive obligations 
were owed by state authorities: ‘[i]f the wishes of the deceased are not sufficiently clearly 
established, relatives should be contacted to obtain testimony prior to tissue removal’.17 
Because the law failed to establish administrative or regulatory mechanisms and 
clearly define the scope of the corresponding obligation or margin of discretion conferred on 
experts or other authorities to ‘explain these rights [to refuse the removal of a deceased 
person’s organs and/or tissue] to the relatives’,18 Ms Elberte had been unable to foresee how 
to exercise her putative right to object to the removal of her husband’s tissue. Consequently, 
the ECtHR found that the Law lacked sufficient precision and did not afford adequate legal 
protection against arbitrariness, accordingly concluding that the interference with Ms 
Elberte’s right to respect for her private life was not ‘in accordance with the law’ within the 
meaning of Article 8(2). Thus, her claim was upheld and she was awarded a total of EUR 
16,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 
 
Discussion 
Networks of actors and performing autonomy 
In certain religious or cultural contexts, a dead body may be viewed as ‘impure’ or 
‘dangerous’, and body parts may be viewed as holding the essence of a self. The ‘essential 
self’ of a person can be reflected in the limbs, face, heart and so forth. The removal of such a 
vital part of the body would reflect less an autonomous decision made by the deceased whilst 
alive and in communication with his or her relatives, and more an affront to the society’s 
belief system and an ‘injury’ to the deceased body or its soul, ill preparing its passage to 
another world. Autonomy, as understood by the notion of self-determination, is balanced with 
the collective values reflected in the belief system.  
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In other religious or cultural contexts, such as those in Council of Europe member 
states, the body and body parts generally are not viewed in this manner. If they were, the 
tissue and organ transplantation system would likely reflect a very different kind of 
practice.19 Procuring and harvesting of human tissue is made acceptable in a country like 
Latvia by treating a competent adult person as an ‘autonomous being’ capable of exercising 
choice over removal of organs and tissue, which in turn are viewed as (mere) parts (if not 
‘waste’) of a self-determining body. Consequently, what we see in these contexts is a diverse 
but stable network of actors, from recipients and families of the brain-dead to governance 
boards and tissue/organ brokers, performing tasks that purport to maintain the autonomy (and 
anonymity) of donors.20 
At the same time, social scientists have observed how tissue and organ transplantation 
and emergent ‘tissue economies’ have resulted in novel understandings of human 
individuality and relatedness. Noting, for example, that donors (and families) and recipients 
alike often experience donation as a ‘gift of life’ that produces an ongoing bond between 
them, these studies challenge us to consider how classic notions of (atomistic) autonomy are 
reworked with, or undone by, developments in organ transfer and tissue exchange.21 These 
studies also point to howan increased flowof human tissue and organs, often between 
countries of unequal economic development, relates to transnational economic and 
technological imbalances. An ensemble of medical, scientific and politico-economic forces 
are creating new frontiers of ‘biocapital’, altering the relationship between countries and their 
citizenry in the process.22 Viewed from this perspective, the ECtHR’s endorsement of Ms 
Elberte’s right to refuse her husband’s tissue removal as an aspect of her ‘right to respect for 
private life’ glosses over how the classic notion of the autonomous individual as a stable, 
fixed, atomistic and encapsulated self is increasingly challenged by the ability and demand to 
harvest human tissue in an era of transnational, biocapitalized medical science.  
11 
 
Latvia’s failure to provide a robust mechanism for giving proper effect to the self-
determining rights and wishes of its citizens resulted in a destabilization of the network that 
allows for human tissue and organs to circulate anonymously and independently from the 
body of deceased and living donors. The murkiness surrounding whether or not Mr Elberts 
gave consent whilst alive, and the corresponding question of the legality of harvesting tissue 
from his body, brought into stark relief the inability of local institutional arrangements to 
maintain the rights and interests of the deceased in the face of broader trends in global 
scientific research and medical care.23 Questions of control over tissue and agency and of 
how one should be treated post-mortem speak to the need to continually redefine the rights 
and corresponding duties of relevant stakeholders. How can, and how should, bioethics and 
the law – two systems both traditionally grounded in the concept of respect for autonomous 
individuals – respond to technological and sociopolitical changes that are challenging, if not 
outmoding, such a concept of the atomistic individual, especially if and when laws also 
recognize the legal claims of relatives with respect to the remains of a deceased family 
member? 
Consent to what? And whose tissue is it anyway? 
Viewed from an ethical perspective, the decision raises equally difficult questions. 
The central function of consent is traditionally seen to uphold the moral principle of 
respecting an individual’s autonomy, that is, one’s freedom of rational self-governance and 
selfdetermination.24 Whilst there is considerable disagreement about the nature, scope or 
strength of this individual-centred principle,25 as seen, for example, in the alternative 
concepts of relational autonomy26 and ‘caring autonomy’,27 there is a general consensus that 
consent means allowing a competent person to be ‘actively involved in shaping and directing’ 
all aspects of her life.28 In the context of health care and biomedicine, such consent is 
characterised by intentionality, understanding and freedom from controlling (or undue) 
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influence.29 The standard ethical procedure is one where consent is sought explicitly from the 
person whose rights and interests are concerned, unless the person is deemed temporarily or 
permanently incompetent, in which case consent is sought from a proxy or surrogate who 
might be best placed to know the individual’s wishes. In some contexts, however, ‘presumed 
consent’ may be the operating paradigm, such as in an emergency situation where it is 
impossible to secure consent from the patient or a proxy in time without jeopardizing the 
patient’s life.  
For organ and tissue procurement after death, it is not a universally accepted moral 
principle that competent adults must expressly consent to the removal of their own tissue or 
organs. Indeed, there is no standard operating consent paradigm for donation. Countries may 
operate under a system of opt in (explicit consent), with the use of a donor card, for example, 
or under a system of opt out (presumed consent), where individuals are considered to have 
given consent to posthumous procurement of organs and tissue for research or medical 
purposes unless otherwise stated. Countries tend to operate under a sub-classification of these 
two systems; these are categorized as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ opt in/opt out systems, with ‘soft’ 
systems allowing for the opinions of relatives to be considered and ‘hard’ systems 
disregarding consideration of such opinions. Douglas and Cronin remark that ‘there is 
evidence that, in general, opt-out systems have higher donation, and lower refusal, rates than 
express consent (opt-in) systems’.30 
There is quite a bit of diversity in the spectrum of opt in / opt-out donation systems.31 
At one end of the spectrum, a hard opt out system (e.g. as exists in Austria) allows health 
professionals to remove tissue or organs from every adult who dies unless a person has 
registered to opt out; objections from relatives are disregarded. At the other end of the 
spectrum, a hard opt in system allows health professionals to remove tissue or organs only 
from adults who have expressly consented to such removal, regardless of the relatives’ 
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objections. Soft systems operate in between. As noted above, they allow for the 
considerations of relatives to be taken into account – but here there are critical distinctions. In 
some soft opt out countries, such as Belgium, health professionals can remove tissue or 
organs from every adult who dies, unless a person has registered to opt out, or the relatives 
object to removal and the relatives take it upon themselves to communicate with the health 
professionals. In these countries, there is no positive obligation of health professionals to 
consult with relatives. In other soft opt out countries, such as Spain, however, health 
professionals can remove tissue or organs from every adult who dies, unless a person has 
registered to opt out, but it is standard for health professionals to actively consult with 
relatives to obtain their agreement at the time of the person’s death. Finally, in soft opt in 
systems, such as in England or Scotland, health professionals can remove tissue or organs 
from adults who have expressly consented to (or ‘authorized’) such removal, but generally 
health professionals will inform relatives that the person has opted in and the health 
professionals may choose not to proceed with removal if certain relatives object. 
Surveying these various tissue and organ donation systems, it is evident that several 
types necessitate or encourage health professionals to communicate with (close) relatives, 
reflecting a concern that the deceased’s relatives should have an opportunity to input on the 
proper way to dispose of their relative’s body, particularly if the wishes of the deceased are 
not recorded. In this sense, the autonomy of the deceased person is always ‘relational’: the 
choice expressed by the person when alive is produced, reproduced and ultimately given 
effect through a network of institutions, individuals (e.g. health professionals and family) and 
the practices that bind them together – from face-to-face interaction to the signing of forms, 
the preparation of advance statements and the reviewing of passports.  
Yet soft opt out systems that incorporate the consent (and its necessary corollary 
refusal) of relatives, whether through law or practice, intrigue us. Might we be asking both 
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too little and too much of consent in such a system? As Roger Brownsword notes, 
undervaluing consent is a concern in an opt out system if a country has not made its case for 
requiring participation: ‘To presume consent on the basis of an omission (non opt-out) is a 
fiction; and to purport to justify such a scheme by reference to consent might be a fraud, 
consent being deployed to defend the indefensible’.32 In this situation, the notion of the 
consent of relatives is a nonsense: they cannot consent to that which is unconsentable. At the 
same time, overvaluing consent can also be a concern in an opt out system where a country 
has made a legitimate case for requiring participation (i.e. a full, substantive justification). 
Does this system then need a consent-based justification in order to defend its legitimacy? 
We would respond in the negative, for no court of law has ruled either hard or soft opt out 
systems as per se violating human rights. So then why go to the trouble at all of seeking the 
consent of relatives, regardless of whether the deceased person opted out? We suggest that, 
quite simply, it is because it is ‘a local courtesy rather than a moral requirement.’33 Opt out 
countries operate on the premise that citizens have a duty to participate; the justification for 
the system relies substantively on a rights-focused account of the public interest, not 
procedurally ‘in the supposed consent signalled by those who do not take steps to opt-out’.34 
If a country is relying on a non-consent–based, public interest justification (such as for the 
protection of public health), it makes little difference from a moral standpoint to inquire 
about the views of the relative. It is a courtesy, not a condition. In both instances, whether as 
overvaluation or undervaluation, consent is a distraction, not an imperative. 
In an opt in system, as exists in England,35 the role of a relative’s consent differs. 
Here, the system tends to place a premium on the (individual) autonomy of persons, allowing 
them to make a determination as to what happens with their body after death. If they express 
a wish to donate their tissue or organs, then that wish is theoretically (read: in law) respected, 
regardless of the wishes of the relatives. The relatives do not have any legal right or lawful 
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veto over those wishes; as such, there is no role for the consent of relatives. The relatives may 
opine and object, but they cannot agree to waive a right, for they have no prima facie right 
recognized in law in this situation. 
Yet we know that in practice this does not happen. Even if an opt in system is 
couched in consent, as in England, ‘it is, in practice, still strongly influenced by veto insofar 
as both the donor and the surviving relatives can frustrate the other’s wish to donate – the 
former by way of statute, the latter by custom’.36 In the case of England (and Scotland), 
relatives have no legal right or lawful veto over a deceased’s wishes, but nor do health 
professionals have a legal duty to comply with a deceased’s wish to donate. There is, 
therefore, significant space for manoeuvring around the letter of the law. For example, the 
NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) Transplant Activity Report for 2013–2014 notes that 
the consent/authorization rate was 89% when the deceased’s wishes were known at the time 
of potential donation, but 119 families overruled their loved one’s known wish to be a 
donor.37 This means that relatives can wield tremendous extralegal authority over a 
deceased’s body. Similarly, if deceased persons express or record no wish during their 
lifetime, health professionals may, through customary practice, approach relatives to establish 
any known wishes of the deceased.38 Again, we emphasize that this is not a question of 
consent, but rather a gathering of evidence to determine the known wishes of the deceased. 
Another situation arises, however, where deceased persons never recorded any wishes, and 
those wishes are unknown by relatives. Here, a relative is asked by a health professional to 
consent, or perhaps phrased better, to assent – that is, to agree to waive the deceased’s person 
right to bodily integrity – a right which does not extinguish upon death.  
What we see then is that in both opt out and opt in organ and tissue donation systems, 
there is only one scenario where consent from a relative is true consent: where the deceased 
was obligated to expressly authorize (i.e. opt in to) the removal of organs or tissue from his or 
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her body, did not do so and did not express his or her wishes to a relative whilst alive, and 
health professionals deem the tissue or organs viable for removal. Here, and only here, does 
consent of a relative play a viable role.  
Yet, even here, we would argue that the consent is an expression of the relative’s 
relational autonomy in the sense that it arises from the familial relationship and merely 
signals a waiver of the right to the bodily integrity of the deceased. It is similar to other proxy 
consents in that we can assume that the relative is acting according to what the deceased 
would have wished herself or himself. Ms Elberte denied this view, however, instead 
claiming that another right was implicated in her consent, namely, her right to respect for her 
private life. But how can this be if consent is understood as permission to waive the benefit of 
a right in question – be it privacy, confidentiality, bodily integrity and so forth? What right 
was Ms Elberte seeking to waive if not Mr Elberts’ right to bodily integrity? Nothing in her 
claim suggested she sought consent as a means to give effect to Mr Elberts’ wishes and to 
express relational autonomy in the sense outlined above; everything suggested she wished to 
exercise her own right to self-determination, a kind of autonomy of relations claim hung on a 
right to private life hook.  
What might this right entail in the context of exercising an executive decision over the 
body of another, framed not as a waiver of a right of another but as an expression of a 
(presumably) decisional private life right of one’s own? Indeed, if it is not about waiving a 
right to bodily integrity, but rather is about decisional private life, would a relative have a 
right to veto an express consent given by the deceased individual whilst alive, and if so, what 
exactly is the moral foundation of this right? Would it still be about ‘respect for private life’? 
And how can we say consent in this context if it is really a matter of vetoing any action 
performed on another’s body? Consent cannot be the right term to use in this case. Section 4 
of the Law never used this term in relation to the relatives, and a ‘right to object’ is not 
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necessarily synonymous with consent, which is often treated instead as some form of active, 
affirmative permission and agreement.39 Surely in a context as fraught as this, where consent 
is so contestable, the ECtHR would have done better to speak of permission or refusal 
simpliciter.40  
That the ECtHR avoided these questions points to the difficulty in defining the nature 
and scope of autonomy (or should we say autonomies?) in posthumous tissue and organ 
procurement and its relation to consent. If such decisions are truly left to the remit of the 
legislature and courts, the Latvian Government, in this case, does seem to have been 
operating under a soft opt out consent system (at least to a substantial degree), where 
individuals are provided an opportunity to opt out during their lifetime (by stating this in their 
passport) and where the (closest) relatives also have some nebulous right to veto removal in 
the absence of expressed wishes of the deceased. In this case, the driving ethical concern is 
whether: (1) Latvia had upheld its moral obligation in ensuring that its citizens had been 
made aware of the legitimate public interest behind the opt out system so that consent or 
authorization could be considered meaningful and (2) the system allowed relatives to exercise 
meaningfully their statutory rights in objecting to the removal. In accepting the claim as one 
of consent, and by forgoing deeper ethical analysis of this autonomy of relations approach, 
the ECtHR’s invocation of Article 8’s ‘right to respect for private life’ certainly would fit 
within Article 8 judicial precedent that engages the application of the right to respect of 
autonomy.41 Yet, it is precisely this framing, skirting of issues and lack of deep ethical 
analysis that troubles us about this decision and about what may come. 
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The legal impact  
The ECtHR’s decision encourages legislators throughout the Council of Europe’s 
member states to ensure that if their tissue and organ donation laws allow for relatives to 
consent to or to refuse removal of a deceased’s organs or tissue (as is the case, in varying 
modalities, in Belgium, Sweden, Spain and Italy, for example), they must be sufficiently clear 
in prescribing the positive obligations of authorities or health professionals to: (1) consult 
with these relatives (however so defined) prior to tissue or organ removal, (2) explain their 
rights to them and provide them with material information to make a meaningful decision, 
and (3) obtain their consent or refusal, as the case may be. This is not the same as suggesting 
that member states must provide a right to consent or refuse to relatives. Rather, the ECtHR 
has confirmed that – irrespective of the position that a country takes on a role for relatives in 
the disposal of the tissue or organs of a deceased relative – the manner and means to give 
proper effect to any right that is created must be in place to comply with the Convention and 
avoid arbitrariness. The issue in Elberte appears to be that Latvia created the problem for 
itself by establishing in its domestic Law a right for relatives to refuse a deceased relative’s 
organ and tissue removal, but then failed to provide them with effective means to exercise 
this right. More profoundly, though, we wonder whether the ECtHR’s decision has laid the 
foundation for a future, free-standing right for relatives to oppose removal of their deceased 
relative’s tissue or organs, regardless of the deceased’s own wishes, in the name of the 
relatives’ human ‘right to respect for private life’. 
Indeed, in addition to the socio-ethical questions raised above, multiple legal question 
arise from Elberte. The ECtHR’s decision reads as though the pendulum of communicative 
responsibility swings only far left and far right; but just how far should an obligation fall on 
authorities such as health professionals to approach relatives and explain to them their rights? 
Is there any room for the responsibility to fall on relatives to express their consent or refusal 
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to authorities, as is the case in Belgium? What level of specificity is needed in the law to 
avoid the risk of arbitrary action by authorities? Given the procedural nature of this decision, 
which authorities should approach the relatives? How far and for how long should efforts to 
make contact be made? What happens when relatives disagree? Additionally, physicians, 
surgeons and forensic experts may not be in the best position to approach and communicate 
with relatives about removal and rights to consent or refuse, not least because of potential 
conflict of interest concerns. Should the state provide for specially trained ‘trusted third 
party’ staff like psychologists, counsellors and communication experts?  
Another issue troubles us. Whilst acknowledging that it is not the role of the ECtHR 
to decide upon the legitimacy of consent systems and impose legal harmonization through 
judicial fiat, we do question why the ECtHR went to some lengths to deny the need to 
consider whether a presumed consent versus ‘explicit consent’ system operated in Latvia in 
2001.42 However, much they skirted this question (and ensuing analysis under Article 8(2)) 
and framed it as a normative issue – when the parties framed it as an issue of factual 
determination – it nonetheless coloured the decision in a number of ways.  
First, the ECtHR acknowledged that the parties’ views differed in the exercise of the 
closest relatives’ right to object. Ms Elberte rested her Article 8 claim on the argument that in 
2001, an opt in (explicit) consent system operated in Latvia, and the experts had a positive 
duty to ask the ‘closest relatives’ whether any of them would consent or object the removal.43 
The Latvian government counterargued that the absence of any expressed objection by any 
close relative was sufficient to proceed with tissue or organ removal, that is, Latvia was 
operating within the legitimate confines of an opt out (presumed consent) system.44  
Second, the ECtHR supplemented its decision about the arbitrariness of the Latvian 
Law by referencing a number of European and international instruments on the matter of 
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tissue removal after death, which in its view accord ‘particular importance to the principle 
that the relatives’ views must be established by means of reasonable enquiries’.45 We 
question why the ECtHR felt the need to reference these wider international instruments at 
all. If the issue before them truly was a question of discretion for each member state 
(‘Whichever [consent] system a State chooses to put in place . . .’46), why was the focus not 
solely on the terms of the Latvian Law as it existed in 2001? More troublingly, only two of 
the cited instruments date prior to 2001. Disagreement with reference to any international 
instruments aside, it is our opinion that documents dated post-2001 should have had no 
impact on assisting interpretation of whether the Law was sufficiently clear at the time of Mr 
Elberts’ tissue removal.  
Yet, even for the two pre-2001 instruments cited, the picture is less than clear. The 
1978 Council of Europe ‘Resolution on harmonisation of legislations of member states 
relating to removal, grafting and transplantation of human substances’ recommended that a 
‘state may decide that the removal must not be affected if, after such reasonable inquiry as 
may be practicable has been made into the views of the family of the deceased, [ . . . ] an 
objection is apparent’.47 No further guidance on the manner and means to give proper effect 
to this inquiry is provided. The other document, a 1998 Opinion from the European Group on 
Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission, entitled ‘On Ethical 
aspects of human tissue banking’, recommended only that under presumed consent systems, 
‘doctors must ensure as far as possible that relatives or next of kin have the opportunity to 
express the deceased person’s wishes, and must take these into account’.48  
Reiterating that Council of Europe member states are free to consider these guidelines 
and recommendations or not (as in the case of hard opt out countries like Austria), we are not 
persuaded that ‘European and international’ instruments have accorded particular importance 
on a ‘principle’ that relatives’ views must be established by means of reasonable enquiries. 
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Nor are we persuaded that these instruments spell out whether it is the responsibility of 
relatives or authorities to contact the other to express or obtain consent to tissue or organ 
removal. The 1978 resolution gives member states wide latitude and little detailed guidance, 
and the 1998 Opinion speaks only to relatives expressing the deceased’s person’s wishes, not 
their own. Taken together, the two instruments serve to undermine the authority of the 
ECtHR’s decision. 
In sum, then, the question of whether Ms Elberte’s right to respect for private life had 
been violated does turn to some degree on whether the Law operated on explicit or presumed 
consent. Determining the procedural quality of the Latvian Law cannot be performed without 
drawing in larger determinations about the substantive donation system in place. By steering 
clear of ruling on the legitimacy and scope of a presumed consent versus explicit consent 
system, the ECtHR decision’s impact may be more profound and perplexing. Rather than an 
‘open and shut’ arbitrariness case, the ECtHR has opened the door to serious doubt regarding 
the procedural adequacy of certain soft opt out consent systems currently in operation 
throughout the Council of Europe member states (a number, we note, that it is not 
insignificant), as well as opt in systems that allow some means for relatives to consent or 
object.  
Countries such as Austria, which operate under a hard opt out (presumed consent) 
system that make it impossible for relatives to object to removal, would appear safe from 
judicial scrutiny under the Convention because they do not bother making any reference to 
relatives’ wishes at all. Countries such as Spain that operate under one type of soft opt out 
system may be safe from judicial scrutiny under the Convention, because (presumably) they 
make it sufficiently clear in law that health professionals should consult with relatives prior to 
any tissue or organ removal. However, for soft opt out countries such as Belgium that make it 
incumbent on relatives to communicate with health professionals to rightfully object to 
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removal, the decision will carry special importance. It may be the case that Belgium’s current 
law sufficiently stipulates that the duty to communicate falls on relatives rather than on health 
professionals and sufficiently describes how to give proper effect to a right to object – but 
this is an open question. 
Finally, although the Latvian Government failed to raise the question, we certainly 
wonder whether a relative’s right to object – read here in light of the decision as a right of a 
relative to express his or her own autonomous judgement whether tissue or organs of the 
deceased should be removed – can securely fit within an Article 8 ‘right to respect for private 
life’, a right which, as noted in the concurring opinion of Judge Wojtyczek, increasingly 
seems to entail a general freedom of action.49 Even if the concept of private life is a ‘broad 
term not susceptible to exhaustive definition’,50 must the ECtHR not at some point engage in 
a discussion of its legal contours? As Moreham remarks, ‘The breadth of the private life 
interest, combined with the Court’s reluctance to identify either categories into which 
“private life” can be divided or specific examples on which its decisions are based, makes it 
difficult to ascertain exactly what domestic courts should be taking into account when 
developing domestic law.’51  
The position of the ECtHR so far has been to embark on a steady campaign of 
expansion. Elberte tracks a growing judicial recognition of the legal interests that relatives 
have in the bodies of their relatives, and indeed the ECtHR cited its other judgements that 
have already confirmed this, such as the return of the bodies of children.52 The right to 
respect for private life is no longer merely a negative right that an individual holds against the 
State; it is now a positive right that bestows upon an individual the power to act and, in this 
case, apparently to consent to the means of disposal of another person’s body.53 Meaningful 
exploration of the bounds of private life so as to contain this hitherto generic legal interest 
under Article 8 has been lacking and is needed. 
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It is needed because we are concerned with where the reasoning of Elberte may lead. 
The consent of a relative is now linked to the right to respect for private life, which itself can 
now oblige action rather than inaction. But how much procedural detail must countries have 
in their domestic laws to satisfy a relative’s right to respect for private life, which through its 
positive manifestation now entails a right of a relative to exercise an autonomous and 
authoritative decision on the potential interference with a deceased’s body? Should we 
continue to rely on this individualist model of autonomy ‘for regulating what is essentially a 
matter of interpersonal relationships?’54 What impacts on society might result from this 
expanding link between human rights and individualist autonomy? And what is the extent of 
the positive duties placed on competent authorities to communicate with different relatives 
and weigh their potentially conflicting opinions?  
Council of Europe member states have entered into a new era of legal uncertainty. 
Indeed, what concerns us most is that this decision may serve as precedent to future claims – 
even in opt in jurisdictions with no mention in domestic law of relatives and consent – of an 
individualist autonomous human right of a close relative to express authoritative judgement 
over the possible removal of a deceased relative’s bodily tissue or organs. If opt in 
jurisdictions already allow in practice in some instances relatives to override even the express 
wishes of the deceased, how far removed are we from a court finding that, even if not 
articulated expressly in law, through a country’s permissive actions, they are estopped from 
denying the relative’s stand-alone so-called right to consent? Quo vadis the new balance 
between the right to respect for private life and the lifesaving benefits of tissue and organ 
transplantation, a matter we dare say may invoke other Convention Articles: the right to life 
and freedom from discrimination.55 
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Conclusions 
What lessons can we draw from this case? For one, we learn that law continues to 
struggle with death and donation. There are never easy solutions in matters relating to tissue 
and organ transplantation, the interests of the deceased, the interests of the deceased’s 
relatives and the interests of society in improving others’ health. No sooner than the final 
chapter of one person’s life ends do many tragic epilogues begin in a common but varying 
tale of multiple persons claiming and deciding upon interests in body, soul and patrimony. In 
Elberte, we learned that the law of one country failed to give proper effect to a right that it 
created for those closest to a deceased. We also learned that its failure in so doing was a 
fundamental failure – a human rights failure. Certainly many facts in this case are disturbing, 
and the aura of a ‘bodysnatcher’ storyline permeates the text. 
But this cannot be a lesson that satisfies. To be sure, Ms Elberte’s Article 3 claim of 
inhuman or degrading treatment was rightfully successful. Latvian state authorities treated 
both the deceased Mr Elberts and Ms Elberte with an unacceptable amount of disrespect – the 
latter over many years. That Ms Elberte suffered shock and a high degree of emotional 
suffering would surprise few. Yet the acceptance of the Article 8 claim of a violation of her 
right to respect for private life does not instruct so much as obscure. Citizens in the member 
states bear witness to the ever-expanding juridical nature of private life, whilst the norms of 
privacy undergo profound change in a socially mediated society. For their part, member state 
legislatures bear caution as to the putative relation(al) interests private life may embody in 
law and how these interests relate to consent. Puzzling and somewhat ironic it is, however, 
that Ms Elberte’s claim was not accepted by the ECtHR as a part of family life – which is 
necessarily relational – but rather as her own individual private life. The citizen is the 
recipient of a mysterious, mixed message about relationality that remains firmly grounded in 
individualism. The ultimate lesson may be that the ECtHR’s decision reflects our own 
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collective ambivalence about, and on-going quest to shape, our rights, duties and roles as 
individual, relative and citizen in an at once connected and separated 21st century.   
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